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Fining Member States under the SGP, or how enforcement is
different from implementation underArticle 291 TFEU: Spain v.
Council
Case C-521/15, Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union,
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 20 December 2017,
EU:C:2017:982
1. Introduction
While this case finds its origins in the context of the reinforced economic
governance in the Eurozone, it is of fundamental importance for the EU legal
order at large. Although the Lisbon Treaty seems to regulate exhaustively the
implementation of EU law through Article 291 TFEU, the Court in the present
case has carved out the enforcement of EU law (at least vis-à-vis the Member
States) therefrom. In addition, the judgment clarifies subsidiary issues related
to the procedural rights of Member States in enforcement proceedings under
EU law. The fundamental constitutional point raised by this judgment relates
to the executive function of the Council as it identifies a previously unknown
sui generis implementing power. The Court did so in order to hold Article
51(a), third indent, of the Statute (which entrusts jurisdiction to the General
Court) inapplicable and to accept jurisdiction to hear the case.
The actual dispute itself resulted from the amendment of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) by the six-pack. One feature of the six-pack was that it
introduced sanctions also in the preventive part of the SGP.1 This is also
reflected in Article 8 of Regulation 1173/20112 which henceforth allowed the
Council to impose fines on euro Member States for the manipulation of
statistics, or more precisely for the “misrepresentation by Member States of
deficit and debt data either intentionally or through serious negligence”. The
1. Martucci, “La longue marche vers le cadre budgétaire intégré de la zone euro”, 616 Rev.
de l’UE (2018), 157–165; Antpöhler, “Emergenz der europäischen Wirtschaftsregierung – Das
Six Pack als Zeichen supranationaler Leistungsfähigkeit”, 72 ZaöRV (2012), 353–395, 367.
2. Art. 8 does not as such come under the Regulation’s chapter III (on sanctions in the
preventive part of the SGP) but it is in overarching provision relevant to the entire application of
Arts. 121 and 126 TFEU.
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legislature deemed this power necessary in light of the role played by
statistical fraud in triggering the Greek and euro crises.3
2. Factual background of the case and legal issues
2.1. Legal framework
Article 8 of Regulation 1173/2011 prescribes that the Commission is
empowered to make all necessary investigations, especially when there are
serious indications that a Member State is misrepresenting its deficit and debt
statistics. The Regulation is careful to spell out that any sanctions imposed are
administrative in nature but, given their punitive character, it also emphasizes
that the “Commission shall fully respect the rights of defence of the Member
State concerned during the investigations”,4 inter alia laying down a right to
be heard and the opportunity to comment on all facts relied upon by the
Commission. Ultimately, fines are imposed by the Council, acting under
normal (not reversed) QMV rules, pursuant to a Commission
recommendation.
Article 8 of Regulation 1173/2011 thus links up with the provisions of
Chapter III of the earlier Regulation 479/2009, dealing with the quality of data
supplied by (all) Member States. To ensure the quality and comparability of
statistics, Regulation 479/2009 instructs the Commission (Eurostat) to carry
out regular dialogue visits to the Member States, and mandates it to carry out
methodological visits “where significant risks or problems with respect to the
quality of the data have been clearly identified.”5 Although the
methodological visits clearly have a “corrective” dimension to them, they
have no punitive character, nor do they result in punitive measures. As a result,
the question of the rights of defence does not arise and Regulation 479/2009
merely provides that “the Commission (Eurostat) shall transmit its provisional
findings to the Member States concerned for comments.”6
The actual link between Article 8 of Regulation 1173/2011 and Eurostat’s
methodological visits to Member States is then only made explicit in the
Commission’s Delegated Decision 2012/678,7 supplementing Regulation
3. See Lastra and Louis, “European Economic and Monetary Union: History, trends, and
prospects”, 32 YEL (2013), 1–150, p. 122.
4. See Art. 8(3) of Regulation 1173/2011, O.J. 2011, L 306/1.
5. See Art. 11b(2) of Regulation 479/2009, O.J. 2009, L 145/1 as amended by Regulation
679/2010, O.J. 2010, L 198/1.
6. See Art. 11 of Regulation 479/2009.
7. Delegated Decision 2012/678, O.J. 2012, L 306/21.
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1173/2011 and establishing the framework for its investigations. The Decision
provides in its Recital 8 that any formal investigation (under Regulation
1173/2011) is normally to be preceded by a methodological visit (foreseen in
Regulation 479/2009). This is not a condition sine qua non, however, since
Article 2(3) of the delegated decision provides that “[t]he Commission may
opt not to conduct such an investigation until a methodological visit has been
carried out in accordance with a decision taken by the Commission (Eurostat)
under Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.”
2.2. Facts of the case
The relevant facts of the case may be summarized as follows: in May 2012
Spain notified Eurostat that the deficits for the years 2008–2012 which it had
reported two months earlier (in March 2012) had to be revised in light of
undeclared expenditure by theAutonomous Community of Valencia. Eurostat
subsequently carried out four visits to Spain in a period spanning from May
2012 to September 2013. The first of these visits was organized as a
“preparatory technical visit”, the next two as “dialogue visits” and the last one
as an “ad hoc” visit.8 In July 2014 the Commission initiated the formal
investigation under Regulation 1173/2011.9 In May 2015 the Commission
concluded its investigation and adopted a recommendation for the Council to
impose a fine,10 which the Council did in July 2015, requiring Spain to pay
EUR 18.93 million.11
Before challenging the Council’s fine in the presently annotated case, Spain
had also challenged the Commission’s 2014 decision to initiate investigations.
Spain requested the annulment of the Commission’s decision since (i) it
related to data on years preceding the entry into force of Regulation
1173/2011, (ii) Spain claimed it had given clear and adequate explanations for
the revision of the data and (iii) because the Commission had allegedly
launched its investigation secretly, thus breaching Spain’s rights of defence.12
The General Court dismissed this action as inadmissible in line with its
well-established jurisprudence on the lack of legal effects produced by
preparatory measures.13
8. Judgment, para 69.
9. Ibid., para 29.
10. Ibid., para 30.
11. Ibid., para 31.
12. Action brought on 22 Sept. 2014, Case T-676/14, Spain v. Commission, see O.J. 2014,
C 388/25.
13. Case T-676/14, Spain v. Commission, EU:T:2015:602.
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2.3. Legal issues and pleas
The first issue which the Court had to address was one of jurisdiction. The
contested decision had initially been adopted and published as a “Council
Decision” but was retroactively requalified as a “Council implementing
Decision”, presumably to be in line with Article 291(4) TFEU. In terms of
allocation of jurisdiction between the General Court and the Court of Justice
this was important, since Article 51 of the Statute of the Court provides that
the exception to the General Court’s general jurisdiction for direct actions
does not apply when the Council acts at issue are either trade defence
measures, implementing measures in the sense of Article 291(2) TFEU or acts
based on Article 108(2) TFEU. In those three scenarios the Court of Justice
does not exceptionally have jurisdiction and the general rule (conferring
jurisdiction on the General Court) applies again.
The pleas advanced by Spain in the procedure before the Court partially
mirrored those it advanced before the General Court but also targeted the
formal investigation of the Commission and the Council’s fine. From a
procedural perspective and according to Spain, (i) the Commission had
infringed its rights of defence by pursuing part of its investigation through
visits outside the framework of the delegated decision; and (ii) the
Commission had violated the principle of good administration (specifically
the requirement of impartiality) by drawing the members of its formal
investigative team largely from the same civil servants that had conducted the
visits from May 2012 to September 2013. Substantively, Spain argued (iii) that
it had not misrepresented any data in the sense of Article 8(1) of Regulation
1173/2011; and (iv) that the fine was incorrectly calculated and could only be
based on the data related to years following the entry into force of Regulation
1173/2011.
3. TheAdvocate General’s Opinion
3.1. Jurisdiction
On the issue of jurisdiction, Advocate General Kokott found in favour of
referring the case to the General Court after weighing the elements in favour
and against this position. According to the Advocate General, a case could be
made to attribute jurisdiction to the Court of Justice, since the classification of
an act by the Council itself is not determinative for its legal classification,14
14. Opinion, para 45.
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and since the basic legislative act did not refer to Article 291 TFEU.15 In
addition, the procedure in casu showed some similarities with the
infringement procedure of Article 258 TFEU,16 and the contested decision
was a follow-up measure to the decisions taken by the Council under Articles
121 and 126 TFEU which, differently from Article 291 TFEU, confer
executive powers directly on the Council.17 The Advocate General also
invoked the Short-selling case in which the Court had ruled that Article 291
TFEU in any event is not exhaustive as to the assignment of implementing
powers,18 thus providing the possibility of the contested decision having been
adopted pursuant to a sui generis implementing power (and thus not pursuant
to Art. 291 TFEU).19
On the other hand, the imposition of a fine appeared to the Advocate
General as a typical “implementing” measure,20 the fact of it being directed to
a Member State rather than a private person not being relevant.21 In addition,
the Advocate General noted that the exception to an exception should not be
interpreted strictly, since it triggers a return to the general rule.22 As a
counterargument to the one based on Articles 121 and 126 TFEU, the
Advocate General observed that any sanctions imposed by follow-up
measures are distinct from the measures adopted pursuant to the Treaty
provisions themselves, resulting in a low risk that both would have to be
adjudicated in the same dispute.23 Finally, the Advocate General noted that
recognizing the jurisdiction of the General Court would allow for an
additional level of judicial review.24 While it is unclear which of these
arguments tilted the balance, Advocate General Kokott ultimately concluded
that the action should have been brought before the General Court.
3.2. Rights of defence
With its first plea, Spain in essence complained of the fact that the
Commission had relied on information gathered during the visits under
15. Ibid., para 46.
16. Ibid., para 53.
17. Ibid., paras. 49–50.
18. In Short-selling, the Court ruled that the legislature may confer implementing powers on
an EU agency, even if Art. 291 TFEU only foresees the Member States, Commission or
Council adopting implementing measures. See Case C-270/12,United Kingdom v.Council and
Parliament, EU:C:2014:18.
19. Opinion, para 52.
20. Ibid., para 47.
21. Ibid., para 48.
22. Ibid., para 54.
23. Ibid., para 57.
24. Ibid., para 56.
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Regulation 479/2009 and prior to the formal investigation to build its case. On
this, the Advocate General noted that Regulation 1173/2011 requires there to
be serious indications of misrepresentation, deducing from this that a mere
suspicion would not allow the Commission to initiate a formal investigative
procedure.25 To this end, the Delegated Decision 2012/678 requires the
Commission to rely on the instruments provided by Regulation 479/2009 to
substantiate the required serious indications.26 Advocate General Kokott
found this to constitute the first phase in the (broadly construed) investigation
procedure. Under the second phase, the Commission’s powers are not based
on Regulation 479/2009 anymore but on Regulation 1173/2011 with the
initiation of the formal investigation procedure.27
To the Advocate General, the essence of Spain’s complaint lay in the fact
that its rights of defence had not been respected during that first phase of the
investigation procedure. Noting that Regulation 479/2009 does not explicitly
guarantee those rights (cf. above),28 the Advocate General observed that a
general requirement of respect for the rights of defence can in any event be
drawn from the Court’s case law.29 In light of this case law, especially in the
area of anti-trust, the Advocate General suggested that the rights of defence
guaranteed in the second phase (under Regulation 1173/2011) might not be
sufficient to make up for the lack of safeguards in the first phase.30
Elaborating this analogy further, however, she noted that there is a
fundamental difference between an undertaking in an anti-trust procedure and
the procedure in casu: for Member States, there is a duty of loyal cooperation
under Article 4(3) TFEU,31 and Spain’s rights of defence had thus not been
violated.32
3.3. Impartiality
As regards Spain’s argument that the objective impartiality of the
Commission was put into doubt by the personal overlap between the teams
conducting the visits and the investigation team, the Advocate General
sidestepped the more fundamental issue whether a Member State can rely on
Article 41 of the Charter. While the Commission argued against this,
Advocate General Kokott noted that in any event there is a general principle of
25. Ibid., para 64.
26. Ibid., para 67.
27. Ibid., paras. 73–74.
28. Ibid., para 80.
29. Ibid., para 81.
30. Ibid., paras. 82–83.
31. Ibid., paras. 88–93.
32. Ibid., para 94.
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a right to good administration which includes impartiality.33 On the merits,
she in principle agreed with Spain and identified a series of alternative
institutional proceedings that would have ensured greater impartiality.34 This
was not the endpoint of the Advocate General’s reasoning, however, as she
proceeded by applying Article 52(1) of the Charter by analogy: a restriction of
the right to an impartial administration could be justified if it is provided by
law and if the essence of the right is respected. In testing these conditions, the
Advocate General relied inter alia on the delegated decision to argue that the
restriction was founded on an adequate legal basis.35 The essence of the right
to an impartial administration was not affected, in turn, because it is the
Council, rather than the Commission, that takes the final decision on a fine.36
The Advocate General further held the restriction to be proportionate given
the complex nature of the subject matter to be investigated and the
Commission’s limited (human) resources and the fact that it is also in Spain’s
interest that Eurostat civil servants familiar with the file are part of the
investigation.37
3.4. The concept of misrepresentation
In its third plea, Spain argued that (i) a revision of provisional statistics in good
faith cannot qualify as a misrepresentation, that (ii) even if there was
misrepresentation this was not relevant since the Commission had not (yet)
relied on the statistics to assess Spain’s compliance with the SGP and that
(iii) its misconduct could not be qualified as serious.
In a rather contorted way the Advocate General found that revisions of
provisional data may indeed be misrepresentations: although she explicitly
recognized that a Commission delegated act cannot determine the scope of the
provision in the basic legislative act which it purports to supplement, she
nonetheless referred to the delegated decision which provides that revisions
resulting from methodological changes or from reviewing temporary figures
are not necessarily misrepresentations if they are clearly and adequately
explained.38 However, the revision in casu resulted from a correction of
Valencia’s downright misapplication of the accounting rules. As a result, it
was a misrepresentation, regardless of whether Spain could give adequate
explanations.39
33. Ibid., paras. 96, 97.
34. Ibid., paras. 101, 103.
35. Ibid., para 106.
36. Ibid., para 107.
37. Ibid., paras. 110–112.
38. Ibid., paras. 122–123.
39. Ibid., para 126.
Case C-521/15 1501
On the second issue, the Advocate General relied on the text of Regulation
1173/2011 to rule out the proposition that sanctions could only be imposed if
the misrepresentation had resulted in knock-on effects in the enforcement of
the SGP. The objective finding of a misrepresentation (that is intentional or the
result of serious negligence) is in itself sufficient for the Council to impose
fines.40
On the third question, the Advocate General noted that while the origin of
the misrepresentation lay in the misapplication of the accounting rules by
Valencia, the actual contentious offence was the reporting of the data to the
Commission.41 Since the reporting took place after Regulation 1173/2011
entered into force, the Advocate General dismissed Spain’s arguments on the
retroactive application of the Regulation.42 Since Spain had conceded that
Valencia had patently breached the EU’s accounting rules, and given that
Spain is accountable for the conduct of its subnational authorities, the
Advocate General concluded that the reporting of data resulting from a
manifestly incorrect application of the accounting rules amounted to serious
negligence in the sense of Article 8 of Regulation 1173/2011.43
3.5. The calculation of the fine
Spain’s fourth plea centred around the correct interpretation of Article 14(2)
of the Commission’s delegated decision, which sets out how the Commission
is to calculate the fine it recommends to the Council. That provision lays down
a maximum of 5 percent of the “larger impact” of the misrepresentation for the
relevant reported years. Spain seemed to rely on the Danish, Estonian and
Swedish language versions of the Decision to argue that the reference amount
should not be the sum of the impact of the misreporting in the four years
concerned but only the highest number of the four years in question. The
Advocate General rejected this reading based on a textual reading of the
provision and in light of its purpose.44 Spain’s objection to the application of
Regulation 1173/2011 to budgetary years preceding the Regulation’s entry
into force also fell flat with the Advocate General, who again recalled that
Spain’s offence did not lie in the calculation of the expenditure as such, but in
the reporting of the data to the Commission.45
40. Ibid., paras. 133–136.
41. Ibid., paras. 139–140.
42. Ibid., para 147.
43. Ibid., paras. 144–145, 151.
44. Ibid., paras. 162–165.
45. Ibid., paras. 170–172.
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4. The Court’s judgment
4.1. Jurisdiction
As to the question whether the contested decision was an implementing
measure in the sense of Article 291(2) TFEU (the only relevant exception
listed in Art. 51 of the Statute), the Court, like the Advocate General,
observed that the species of implementing powers is not exhaustively
regulated in Article 291(2) TFEU.46 The Court therefore proceeded by
verifying whether the implementing power in casu was an implementing
power in the sense of Article 291(2) TFEU.47 Crucially and determinatively,
the Court noted that this required taking account of Article 291 TFEU as a
whole.48 In doing so it noted that the Council’s function under Article 291(2)
TFEU is essentially the same as that of the Member States under Article
291(1) TFEU, the difference being that under Article 291(2) TFEU uniform
conditions in implementation are required (for whatever reason).49
Linking this to the contested decision, the Court found that the act of
imposing a fine on a Member State is conceptually different from the types of
acts which Member States could adopt under Article 291(1) TFEU.50 In
further support of its finding, the Court noted that one of the other two
exceptions in Article 51 of the Statute, viz. the trade defence measures which
the Council might adopt, would become completely redundant if the relevant
exception in casu (implementing measures of the Council pursuant to Art. 291
TFEU) was to be construed so broadly as to also encompass the contested
act.51 For the sake of completeness, the Court added that Regulation
1173/2011 does not refer to Article 291 TFEU and that the purpose of the
power the exercise of which led to the contested decision is not the uniform
implementation of EU law but the deterrence of Member States from
misrepresenting budgetary statistics.52
4.2. Rights of defence
On Spain’s rights of defence the Court noted that (some of) Eurostat’s visits
had taken place before the entry into force of the Commission’s delegated
46. Judgment, paras. 41, 43.
47. Ibid., para 44.
48. Ibid., para 45.
49. Ibid., paras. 47–48.
50. Ibid., para 49.
51. Ibid., para 50.
52. Ibid., paras. 52, 53.
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decision and before launching the formal investigation procedure,53 but all of
them after the entry into force of Regulation 1173/2011, which requires the
Commission to respect the Member States’ rights of defence.54 Although the
Court held that the Regulation only applies to the proceedings in the formal
investigation, it equally found that the rights of defence should also be upheld
beforehand.55 The Court then answered positively on the question whether
Regulation 479/2009 allowed the Commission to perform the four visits
before launching the investigation and whether Spain’s rights of defence were
respected during those visits: ensuring the soundness of the statistics reported
by Member States authorities is precisely the function of the dialogue and
methodological visits foreseen by Regulation 479/2009.56 The fact that a sui
generis “ad hoc” visit, but no formal methodological visit, had been carried
out by Eurostat did not amount to an ultra vires act according to the Court
since the delegated decision makes clear that there is no absolute obligation to
organize a methodological visit.57 Based on the documents before it, the Court
also found that the Commission had informed Spain that its visits related to the
possible misrepresentation of data collected by Valencia.58
4.3. Impartiality
Like the Advocate General, the Court explicitly refrained from addressing the
question whether a Member State can rely on Article 41 of the Charter, noting
that the right to good administration in any event reflects a general principle of
EU law.59 On the merits, the Court held that the Council and Commission
were wrong to argue that the impartiality of the Commission was not at issue
as it is the Council that imposes fines under Regulation 1173/2011.60 Rather,
each actor in a composite procedure is required to be impartial in dispensing
its responsibilities.61 Verifying whether the personal overlap in Eurostat teams
breached the requirement of impartiality, the Court noted that the visits on the
one hand and the investigation on the other hand are subject to different
frameworks and pursued different purposes.62 The former come under
Regulation 479/2009 and are part of the permanent cooperation between
53. Ibid., para 62.
54. Ibid., para 66.
55. Ibid., paras. 67, 68.
56. Ibid., paras. 71–73.
57. Ibid., paras. 74–77.
58. Ibid., para 80.
59. Ibid., paras. 89–90.
60. Ibid., para 93.
61. Ibid., para 94.
62. Ibid., para 96.
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national authorities and Eurostat while the latter comes under Regulation
1173/2011 and entrusts an exceptional and more inquisitorial task to the
Commission.63 It follows from this, according to the Court, that Eurostat and
the Commission necessarily make different assessments, whereby the
former’s assessment does not in itself prejudge the latter’s assessment.64 As a
result, the simple overlap as such cannot amount to a breach of the requirement
of objective impartiality.65 The Court added to this that the recommendation
to the Council under Regulation 1173/2011 is made by the Commission as a
college, not by Eurostat (or the investigation team) and that again the
Commission conducts the formal investigation (not Eurostat).66
4.4. The concept of misrepresentation
Without referring to the Commission’s delegated decision (unlike the
Advocate General), the Court found that the concept of misrepresentation in
Article 8(1) of Regulation 1173/2011 also covered misrepresentations of
provisional data.67 Similarly to the Advocate General, but more pointedly, the
Court further noted that Article 8(1) of the Regulation defines
“misrepresentations by reference to the subject matter of the data concerned,
[not by reference] to the specific effect that they are supposed to produce.”68
As to whether there was serious negligence on the part of Spain, the Court
rejected Spain’s argument that a misrepresentation originating from one
autonomous community within Spain could not qualify as serious negligence
on the part of Spain, and while it accepted that Spain had cooperated in good
faith, it found that this could only have a bearing on the calculation of the fine,
not on the qualification of the infringement.69
4.5. The calculation of the fine
On the retroactivity of the fine, the Court noted that the Member States were
under an obligation since 1994 to report correct data to Eurostat and that the
actual misrepresentation by Spain occurred in March 2012, after the entry into
force of Regulation 1173/2011.70 As to the correct interpretation of Article
14(2) of the Commission’s delegated decision and the determination of the
63. Ibid., paras. 97–98.
64. Ibid., paras. 99, 100.
65. Ibid., para 101.
66. Ibid., para 102.
67. Ibid., paras. 118–122.
68. Ibid., para 124.
69. Ibid., paras. 131–132.
70. Ibid., paras. 148–152.
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correct reference amount, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that
the provision should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the sanctioning
mechanism, viz. deterring the Member States from misrepresenting the
statistics on their debt and deficits.71 In light of this, the Council had properly
calculated the fine imposed on Spain.
5. Comment
The present case, decided by the Grand Chamber, gives much food for thought
and this in relation to a number of questions of EU law, amongst which the
Council’s executive powers; the relationship between Commission delegated
acts and formal legislation; the application of the reinforced SGP; the
procedural guarantees enjoyed by the Member States (including in how far
they can invoke the Charter); and the effet utile interpretation of EU law.
5.1. The Council’s executive powers
The Lisbon Treaty introduced, in Articles 289 to 291 TFEU, the distinction
between legislative acts, delegated acts and implementing acts. As far as
implementing acts go, Article 291(1) TFEU explicitly lays down the idea of
Vollzugsföderalismus: in the EU’s federal set-up, federal legislation is
normally implemented at the State level, not by a federal administration.
However,Article 291(2)TFEU immediately makes clear that exceptions apply
when binding EU law requires uniform conditions in its implementation. In
such a case, the Commission is empowered with an executive function.
Exceptionally the Council may be so empowered, since Article 291(2) TFEU
provides that “in duly justified cases and in the cases provided for in Article 24
and 26 TEU” the Council retains an implementing function post-Lisbon.
Still, in addition to Article 291(2) TFEU there are also
numerous “autonomous executive powers” (vertragsunmittelbare
Verwaltungskompetenzen) to be found in the Treaties: legal bases conferring a
non-legislative competence directly on the Council (or exceptionally the
Commission).72 The procedure through which the Council acts pursuant to
these legal bases may prima facie seem identical to a special legislative
procedure, but since the legal bases do not explicitly qualify the procedure as
legislative, the acts adopted pursuant thereto are not legislative in nature and
71. Ibid., paras. 158–162.
72. See e.g. Art. 42, 43(3), 66, 75, 78(3), 103(1) TFEU.
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the procedure is not subject to the requirements of public deliberation (cf. Art.
16(8) TEU) or subsidiarity scrutiny (protocol No 2).73
One could say that pre-Lisbon these autonomous executive powers had
remained invisible in the Treaties, given that the legislative or non-legislative
nature of a procedure was not explicitly indicated, but it would be more
accurate to say that the Lisbon Treaty created the “autonomous executive
powers” as a(n) (intergovernmental) counterweight to the introduction of the
legislative act (and the concomitant procedural requirements).74 The result is
that the Court of Justice in recent years has been confronted with new
questions related to the Council’s primary law executive powers.75 The
question in casu raised the issue whether, apart from the Council’s executive
powers recognized in Article 291(2) TFEU, and those based directly in
primary law, there is still another category. After all, the Council’s decision
imposing a fine was adopted pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation 1173/2011,
not pursuant to a Treaty legal basis. If the decision was to be qualified as an
implementing decision in the sense of Article 291(2) TFEU, the Court of
Justice (as opposed to the General Court) would not have jurisdiction in light
of Article 51 of the Statute. The only way to accept jurisdiction for the Court
of Justice was to rule that the “implementing decision” in casu was a species
altogether different from the Council’s autonomous executive powers and its
implementing powers under Article 291 TFEU.
While the Advocate General weighed up different arguments for and
against, one of the more important considerations in her reasoning was
arguably the fact that, conceptually, the power to adopt an individual sanction
73. For a discussion, see Bast, “New categories of acts after the Lisbon reform: Dynamics
of parliamentarization in EU law”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 885–928, at 894–897; Ritleng, “The
reserved domain of the legislature: The notion of ‘Essential Elements of an Area’”, in
Bergström and Ritleng (Eds.), Rulemaking by the European Commission –The New System for
Delegation of Powers (OUP, 2016), pp. 145–148.
74. Liisberg notes that the issue of autonomous executive powers was not really discussed
in the Convention’s Working Group on Simplification. See Liisberg, “The EU Constitutional
Treaty and its distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts: Oranges into apples?”,
Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/06, at 18.
75. For instance the question how the Council ought to choose between exercising such an
executive power and an alternative legislative power (together with the Parliament) in Joined
Cases C-103 & 165/12, Parliament and Commission v. Council, EU:C:2014:2400; Joined
Cases C-124 & 125/13, Parliament and Commission v.Council, EU:C:2015:790. See Chamon,
“Institutional balance and Community method in the implementation of EU legislation
following the Lisbon Treaty”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 1501–1554, at 1514–1515. Or the question
whether such a Council executive act may amend a prior legislative act in Joined Cases C-643
& 647/15, Slovakia and Hungary v. Council, EU:C:2017:631. See Chamon, “De
interinstitutionele verhoudingen bij de uitoefening van primairrechtelijke
uitvoeringsbevoegdheden in de ruimte van vrijheid, veiligheid en recht”, 66 SEW: Tijdschrift
voor Europees en economisch recht (2018), 70–76, at 72–73.
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is typically an implementing power.76 The Advocate General did not link this
to the Court’s post-Lisbon case law on Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. In
Biocides or ECHA Fees, the Court defined the function of implementation as
“providing further detail in relation to the content of a legislative act”.77 This
function does not seem transposable to the case at hand. While the Court did
not refer to this case law either, it effectively built a functional argument: by
reading paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 291 TFEU together, it implicitly found
that the Member States, Commission and Council all perform the same
function when they act under those paragraphs. Whatever the Commission or
Council do under Article 291(2) TFEU should therefore be something which
the Member States are also capable of doing, were it not for the uniform
conditions that are required. As the Court notes, this does not seem to apply to
a decision to impose a fine on a Member State.
The Court could have further tied this to its established case law on the
implementation of EU law by the Member States (now under Art. 291 TFEU).
In the Yugoslav maize case, the Court held that under Article 5 EEC the
Member States are required to take all the measures necessary to guarantee the
application and effectiveness of EU law. This general provision is now to be
found in Article 4(3) TEU and has a specific expression in Article 291(1)
TFEU.78 In casu the Court held that even if an act of secondary EU legislation
does not prescribe any penalties for the infringement of its provisions,
Member States are required both to enforce that legislation with effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and to proceed in this enforcement
with the same diligence “as that which they bring to bear in implementing
corresponding national laws.”79 The enforcement of EU law through
sanctions thus clearly comes within the notion of the implementation of EU
law.80
While the Court now accepted that the Council’s power in question is an
implementing power in a generic sense, it rejected the claim that it was an
implementing power in the sense of Article 291 TFEU. The Court could do so
76. Opinion, paras. 46–47.
77. Case C-427/12, Commission v. Parliament and Council (Biocides), EU:C:2014:170,
para 39.
78. In this sense, Dubos finds that Art. 291(1) TFEU could also be read not as a
confirmation of a reserved competence of the Member States, but as a competence granted to
the Member States under EU law. See Dubos, “Objectif d’efficacité de l’exécution du droit de
l’union européenne: La tectonique des compétences”, in Neframi (Ed.), Objectifs et
compétences dans l’Union européenne (Bruylant, 2012), p. 295.
79. Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, EU:C:1989:339, para 25.
80. See also Haguenau-Moizard, “Sanction nationale du droit Communautaire: Sanctions
effectives, proportionnées et dissuasives”, in de la Rochère (Ed.), L’exécution du droit de
l’Union, entre mécanismes communautaires et droits nationaux (Bruylant, 2009), p. 205. This
arguably shows how the Court’s definition of “implementation” in Case C-427/12, Biocides
was too restrictive (cf. supra).
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since it had noted earlier, drawing on Short-selling, that Article 291 TFEU
does not exhaustively define the EU institutions’ and bodies’ implementing
powers. While the Court’s finding in casu indeed logically follows from
Short-selling it only underscores the latter decision’s (and the present one’s)
potential to undermine the reform purported by the Lisbon Treaty.81
While the Court’s reasoning until this point was consistent and in itself
sufficient to accept jurisdiction, the additional argument which it drew from
Article 51 of the Statute itself seems misguided. The Court’s argument on the
relation between the exceptions in Article 51 reads a certain logic into that
Article that is not actually there (any more): the current wording of Article 51
is identical (apart from the references to the numbering of the Lisbon Treaty)
to that introduced following the Nice Treaty.82 However, under the Nice
Treaty, measures adopted in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) were
typically not subject to the comitology regime (of the current Art. 291(3)
TFEU). Following Lisbon this anomaly was corrected and the implementing
measures in the CCP are now all adopted by the Commission and no longer by
the Council.83 This means that the second exception under Article 51(a) has
become void in any event. In light of these considerations, the Court’s
argument based on a systematic reading of Article 51 loses force.
What are the broader ramifications of the Court’s decision? Firstly, but
purely formally, implementing measures sanctioning Member States cannot
be qualified as implementing measures in the sense of Article 291(4) TFEU.84
The present decision of the Court also further undermines the Commission’s
role as the primary executive at EU level, despite Articles 290–291 TFEU.
The simplification brought by the Lisbon Treaty is another casualty. This
because whenever an implementing power is to be exercised at EU level, the
Commission can no longer simply be assumed to be the default actor on which
to confer the implementing power.
81. Chamon, op. cit. supra note 75, at 1535.
82. See Council Decision 2004/407 amending Arts. 51 and 54 of the Protocol on the Statute
of the Court of Justice, O.J. 2004, L 132/5.
83. Although one could refer here to Art. 14(2) of Regulation 2015/1843 laying down
procedures to ensure the exercise of the Union’s rights under international trade rules, that
Article actually provides that certain retaliation measures are to be adopted directly based on
Art. 207 TFEU. Apart from the fact that this seems incompatible with Art. 207 TFEU, which
(unlike Art. 133 EC) only allows the adoption of measures laying down the framework for the
CCP (but no longer measures implementing the CCP), measures based directly on Art. 207
TFEU do not come under the second exception of Art. 51(a) of the Statute either.
84. See e.g. Council Implementing Decision 2017/2350 on imposing a fine on Portugal for
failure to take effective action to address an excessive deficit, O.J. 2017, L 336/24.This decision
is based on a different provision of Regulation 1173/2011.
Case C-521/15 1509
Indeed, in Short-selling the Court opened the possibility to grant an
implementing power to an EU agency despite this possibility not being
foreseen in the Treaties.85 It thereby did away with the idea that Article 291
TFEU exhaustively regulates the implementation of EU law.86 Nonetheless,
Short-selling could still be read as only exceptionally allowing a conferral of
powers to an EU agency rather than to the Commission.87 What the present
case does is require the EU legislature to determine first what type of
implementing power it wishes to confer. Is it an implementing power in the
sense of Article 291 TFEU? Or is it an implementing power that cannot be
properly exercised by the Member States? In the latter case the rules of Article
291 TFEU do not apply and the Council may be empowered, without any
justification. The Court’s decision thus goes in the opposite direction of the
course advocated by some commentators who even argued that the possibility
to entrust the implementation of EU law to the Council pursuant to Article
291(2) TFEU was an anomaly under the new Treaties.88 Kollmeyer for
instance argued that the reference to the Council in Article 291(2) TFEU was
purely declaratory, in the sense that it reaffirmed the Council’s autonomous
executive powers conferred by specific Treaty Articles.89
Of course, the fact that the Court has now identified another species of
implementing power does not necessarily mean that these implementing
85. For a discussion of this case, see e.g. Chamon, “The empowerment of agencies under the
Meroni doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: Comment on United Kingdom v. Parliament and
Council (Short-selling) and the proposed Single Resolution Mechanism”, 39 EL Rev. (2014),
380–403.
86. Although this is the most natural reading of Art. 291 TFEU, resulting in the observation
by Türk that “[g]iven the comprehensive nature of Article 291 TFEU for the adoption of Union
implementing acts … it would not seem permissible to pursue the implementation of certain
Union acts outside the regime of Article 291 TFEU”; see Türk, “Lawmaking after Lisbon”, in
Biondi, Eeckhout and Ripley (Eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP, 2012), p. 78.
87. See Chamon, “Beyond delegated and implementing acts: Where do EU agencies fit in
the Article 290 and 291 scheme?”, in Tauschinsky and Weiß (Eds.), The Legislative Choice
Between Delegated and Implementing Acts in EU Law – Walking a Labyrinth (Edward Elgar,
2018, forthcoming).
88. Schütze, “‘Delegated’ legislation in the (new) European Union: A constitutional
analysis”, 74 MLR (2011), 661–693, at 693; Lenaerts and Desomer, “Towards a hierarchy of
legal acts in the European Union? Simplification of legal instruments and procedures”, 11 ELJ
(2005), 744–765, at 756. But see Kröll who argued that the exception in Art. 291(2) TFEU
allowing the Council to exercise executive powers should be interpreted in light of the
pre-Lisbon case law that sanctioned this practice; see Kröll, “Delegierte Rechtsetzung und
Durchführungsrechtsetzung und das institutionelle Gleichgewicht der Europäischen Union”,
66 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2011), 253–298, at 287.
89. Kollmeyer, Delegierte Rechtsetzung in der EU – Eine Analyse der Art. 290 und 291
AEUV (Nomos, 2015), pp. 348–349.
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powers necessarily have to be exercised by the Council. Indeed, bodies other
than the Council (the Commission, EU agencies, still other bodies) could also
be empowered. Since the legislature should not have unfettered discretion in
this regard, it would be useful here to apply the rule, mutatis mutandis from
Article 291(2) TFEU, to confer this power by default on the Commission and
only exceptionally on the Council (or other bodies).
5.2. Jurisdiction of the Court
How should the outcome of the Court’s reasoning on Article 291 TFEU and
Article 51(a), third indent, of the Statute be assessed from a practical
perspective? In terms of efficiency and legal certainty, the outcome is clearly
preferable since the Court will decide in first and last instance. On the other
hand, the type of decisions that are now reserved to the Court do not seem to
be of particular constitutional importance. This especially so in light of the
recent reform of the General Court. Not coincidentally, that reform has
resulted in the Court of Justice proposing an amendment to its Statute in order
to broaden the jurisdiction of the General Court to the effect that it
encompasses infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.90
Only infringement cases with “constitutional importance” (which the Court of
Justice remarkably limits to issues coming under Title V of part Three of the
TFEU) would still be reserved to the Court. Advocate General Kokott’s
argument referring to the similarity of the procedure with Article 258 TFEU
procedures would thereby be undermined.91 At the same time, the Court also
proposes to transfer jurisdiction from the General Court to the Court in
proceedings under Article 263 TFEU whereby a Member State challenges a
Commission decision ordering that Member State to pay the fines imposed by
the Court in an Article 260(2) TFEU procedure.92 While such cases may at
first sight seem similar to the presently annotated case, it should be remarked
that when such a Commission decision will be scrutinized, this will already be
the third occasion for judicial review. In contrast, in cases in which a Council
decision imposing a fine under Regulation 2011/1073 is reviewed, the Court
will be seized only once. Given these unclear cost-benefits, the Court’s
doctrinal clarification on the notion of implementation in Article 291 TFEU
appears all the more remarkable.
90. See Council of the European Union, Doc. 7586/18 of 28 March 2018.
91. Opinion, para 53.
92. For an earlier suggestion to this effect, see Prete, Infringement Proceedings in EU Law
(Kluwer Law International, 2017), p. 395.
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5.3. Commission delegated acts and formal legislation
One issue that did not prominently feature in this case and which probably
would have merited greater attention was the relationship between the
Commission’s delegated decision from 2012 and the 2011 Regulation which
it supplemented. Let us recall here that Spain essentially contested the validity
of the Council’s fine in light, firstly, of the 2011 Regulation and also in light
of the Commission’s delegated decision. Under Article 290 TFEU however, a
Commission delegated act cannot alter the essential elements of the basic
legislative act and furthermore has to conform to the objectives, content,
scope and duration of the delegation as defined by the basic legislative act.
Although Advocate General Kokott herself noted this,93 she also relied on the
Commission’s delegated decision to interpret Article 8 of the legislative
regulation.94 The Court itself did not do so explicitly, although it evidently
scrutinized the contested decision in light of the delegated decision insofar as
Spain had produced arguments to this effect.95
Yet, when the Court finds that the contested decision conforms to the
provisions of the Commission’s delegated decision, this raises the question,
from the applicant’s perspective, whether the delegated decision conforms to
the basic legislative act (and the general principles of EU law). While this is no
criticism of the Court, since it is not required to verify the internal legality of
the Commission’s delegated act of its own motion,96 Spain could have
included this eventuality in its litigation strategy. As noted elsewhere, when a
party contests the legality of an implementing or a delegated act it seems
useful to raise, in the alternative, an objection of illegality directed at the basic
legislative act or, in this case, the Commission’s delegated act.97
To illustrate this relying on the facts of the present case: Spain inter alia
challenged the decision insofar as the Council had found Spain to be
“seriously negligent”, a notion laid down in the legislative act but elaborated in
the Commission’s delegated act. Evidently, a Member State would want to see
this notion interpreted restrictively, and would therefore be advised to include
a (subsidiary) claim in its application that if its conduct was “seriously
negligent” in the sense of the delegated act, the latter ought to be reviewed in
light of its basic legislative act and other relevant higher-ranking rules of
93. Opinion, para 122.
94. Ibid., paras. 67, 121, 123, 142.
95. See judgment, paras. 77, 132, 153 et seq.
96. Lenaerts, Maselis and Gutman, EU Procedural Law (OUP, 2014), p. 365.
97. Chamon, “Limits to delegation under Article 290 TFEU: The specificity and
essentiality requirements put to the test”, 25 MJ (2018), 231–245.
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Union law.98 Another example could be the upwards or downwards
modulation of the fine in accordance with the criteria defined by the
Commission in Article 14 of its Delegated Decision 2012/678. In the
contested decision, the Council explicitly relies on these criteria, as defined by
the Commission, to calculate the fine. In a second case, the Council is
contemplating further decreasing the amount of the fine in light of Article
14(3)(e) of the delegated decision, which provides that “the degree of
diligence and cooperation, alternatively the degree of obstruction, shown by
the Member State concerned in the detection of the misrepresentation and in
the course of the investigations” will be taken into account.99 This possibility,
also endorsed by the Court in the present case,100 of course raises the question
what the Council’s margin of discretion is when interpreting and applying this
provision. In light of this, a further relevant question is whether the
Commission has properly defined the modulating criteria in light of
the “objectives and purpose” (cf. Art. 290 TFEU) of the delegation. While the
(cooperative) conduct of Member States is also taken into account to
determine the height of a lump sum in proceedings pursuant to Article 260(2)
TFEU,101 the downward modulation should always keep the dissuasive effect
of sanctions intact, so as to ensure that the objectives of Regulation 1173/2011
are not frustrated. These two examples show that such subsidiary pleas would
allow a further scrutiny by the Court, without requiring the Court to take the
heavy-handed step of invalidating a formal legislative act.
5.4. Applying the reinforced SGP: Invoking the Charter
The fact that the SGP has received greater teeth pursuant to the six-pack
means that the stakes for Member States have also been raised. As a corollary
to this, the EU legislature strengthened the Member States’ rights of defence,
and the requirement that the EU institutions act impartially vis-à-vis the
98. The fact that Member States could have brought proceedings against the delegated act
directly should not be a bar to them raising an objection of illegality. See Lenaerts, Maselis and
Gutman, op. cit. supra note 96, pp. 448–450. The fact that the delegated act does not provide the
legal basis of the Council’s decision does not impede an objection of illegality being raised
either. See Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205–208 & 213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri e.a. v.
Commission, EU:C:2005:408, para 214.
99. The Commission has also proposed a fine being imposed on Austria; see
COM(2017)93 final. On the Council’s deliberations, see Council of the EU, Doc. 7538/18, 27
Mar. 2018.
100. See para 132 of the Judgment.
101. See e.g. Case C-241/11,Commission v.Czech Republic, EU:C:2013:423, para 51. See
also Tizzano, “Les développements récents de la procédure de manquement sur manquement”
in Tizzano et al. (Eds.), La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne sous la présidence de
Vassilios Skouris (2003–2015) – Liber amicorum Vassilios Skouris (Bruylant, 2015), p. 655;
Prete, op. cit. supra note 92, p. 264.
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Member States has become an even more important point of attention. In this
light, Spain’s claim that the objective impartiality of the Commission was not
guaranteed was not unsurprising. However, whether Member States can
invoke the corresponding Charter right remains an open question. Generally
the personal scope of application of the Charter’s rights does not cover entities
under public law, apart from certain procedural safeguards.102 In this regard,
Jarass explicitly identifies Article 41 of the Charter as a provision which
Member States may indeed invoke.103 The Court itself has not yet decided this
issue, also because the present case seems to be the first in which a Member
State explicitly invokes Article 41 of the Charter.104 In casu the Court notes
that it need not decide this issue, since the right of good administration in any
event reflects a general principle of EU law.
5.5. Applying the reinforced SGP: the Commission’s impartiality
As to the substance, the Court’s findings fail to convince completely.After all,
the Court’s argument that the visits and the investigation have two different
functions and come under two different frameworks can also be turned on its
head as an argument requiring a different composition of the two teams. The
Court’s finding also stands in contrast with that of the Advocate General, who
found that the requirement of impartiality could have been safeguarded better.
However, an issue with the Advocate General’s justification for the alleged
lack of impartiality is that she held the restriction to be provided for by law, i.e.
by the Commission’s delegated decision.105 This raises the question whether
the requirement (under Art. 52(1) of the Charter) that limitations are provided
for “by law” may be met by (formally) non-legislative acts. In order to
restrictively interpret the exception in Article 52(1) of the Charter it would
seem necessary to require reliance on formal legislation where this is
possible.106 Since a Commission delegated act always finds its legal basis in a
formal legislative act, such a limitation could never be imposed pursuant to a
delegated act.
Going back to the Court’s ruling, its interpretation of the two stages also
seems to sit uneasily with the apparent practice in which the two stages are not
102. Meyer, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 4th ed. (Nomos, 2014),
Art. 51 § 35; Michel, Droits de l’homme, Encyclopédie Dalloz, Droit européen, 2007, refonte
2017, § 91.
103. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der EU, 3rd ed. (Beck, 2016), Art. 51 § 55–56.
104. Implicitly, see Case C-552/15, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:2017:698, para 23.
105. Opinion, para 106.
106. For a discussion, see Peers and Prechal, “Article 52”, in Peers, Hervey, Kenner and
Ward (Eds.), The EUCharter of Fundamental Rights –A Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014),
pp. 1470–1473.
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demarcated clearly from each other, the boundary between the two being quite
fluid (cf. below). It indeed appears that the Commission has significant
discretion in how it goes about investigating possible misrepresentations. In
this regard, the Advocate General even stressed that there needs to be serious
suspicion before the Commission initiates an investigation. To this end it
needs to build a case by gathering information during dialogue and
methodological visits. However, there does not seem to be any limit to how
much information the Commission can gather under the framework of
Regulation 479/2009 before it is required to commence a formal investigation
(or decide that there are no or insufficient grounds for suspicion) under
Regulation 1173/2011. In addition, the Court has confirmed that there is no
obligation on the Commission to organize a methodological visit before
initiating the formal investigation.107
One may wonder therefore whether it would not have been advisable for the
Court to find that the visits and investigation are actually part of one
continuous procedure, where the screws are progressively put on.After all, the
Court’s finding in paragraph 101 (the simple overlap as such cannot amount to
a breach of the requirement of objective impartiality) now seems rather blunt,
especially when compared to how the rights of defence for private parties in
other areas of EU law are safeguarded. To ensure the impartiality of
proceedings in competition law, an independent Hearing Officer (whose
powers and independence have subsequently only been strengthened) was
instated in 1982,108 followed by an independent Hearing Officer being
introduced to anti-dumping procedures in 2007. More recently, the European
Securities and Markets Authority, an EU agency, has been empowered to
enforce EU law vis-à-vis credit rating agencies and trade repositories. The EU
legislature has thereby worked out the relevant procedures in such a way that
within ESMA different and wholly separate units are responsible for
(i) monitoring market players, (ii) investigating suspect cases and
(iii) sanctioning those where infringements were found.109 Presenting the
visits and investigation in the SGP context as one ongoing procedure might
then alleviate impartiality concerns, since it would show that the groundwork
is done by Eurostat acting upon instructions by the Commission which as a
107. The Commission’s report on the manipulation of statistics by Austria does not refer to
a methodological visit prior to the initiation of the formal investigation either. See
COM(2017)94 final, at 9–11.
108. See Williams, “The current role of the Hearing Officer: Another step change” in
Edward, MacLennan, Komninos (Eds.), Ian S. Forrester: A Scot without Borders – Liber
Amicorum, Vol. II (Institute of Competition Law, 2015), pp. 405–420.
109. See van Rijsbergern and Foster, “Rating ESMA’s accountability: ‘AAA’ status”, in
Scholten and Luchtman (Eds.), LawEnforcement by EU Authorities – Implications for Political
and Judicial Accountability (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 57–60.
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college decides to initiate the investigation and recommend a fine. The actual
imposition of the fine is then a responsibility of a third body, the Council.
Indeed, it should be stressed that the present situation is fundamentally
different from competition cases (where a Hearing Officer was found to be
required) since under Regulations 479/2009 and 1173/2011, the Commission
does not at the same time act as an investigator, prosecutor and first instance
decision-maker. In addition, as the Advocate General noted, Member States
are not fully comparable to private individuals, since they are under a duty of
loyal cooperation.
5.6. Applying the reinforced SGP: The blurred line between Regulations
479/2009 and 1173/2011
In light of the Court’s decision, the Commission’s discretion as to how long
information may be gathered during visits and when to initiate a formal
investigation may be problematic since it leaves the applicability of
Regulation 1173/2011 and the explicit requirements on the rights of defence
laid down in Delegated Decision 2012/678 in the hands of the Commission.
As long as the formal investigation is not initiated, the procedure is governed
by Regulation 479/2009, which lays down a more permissive standard as
regards the rights of defence. Indeed, the Court in casu noted that Spain had
had the opportunity to comment on the Commission’s provisional findings (as
required under Regulation 479/2009) and that it was informed beforehand on
the purpose of Eurostat’s visits. However, Delegated Decision 2012/678
provides for a more generous protection by also foreseeing access to the file
and the right to legal representation.110
5.7. Applying the reinforced SGP: Retroactivity
The present case was also important to determine whether this part of the
reinforced SGP has indeed resulted in greater deterrence. Fortunately, the
Court applied an effet utile interpretation of some of the provisions at issue.
This was clear in the interpretation of the reference amount of the fine, where
the Court took account of the need for the sanction to have dissuasive effect.111
It also played a role when the Court assessed Spain’s plea to the effect that the
sanction was invalid insofar as it applied retroactively. Indeed, the
misrepresented data spanned a period dating back to 2008, i.e. well before
the entry into force of Regulation 1173/2011. This problem is reminiscent of
the Court’s case law in competition matters in which it found that the
110. See Arts. 10 and 12 of Delegated Decision 2012/678.
111. Judgment, para 161.
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Commission could rely on its 1998 Guidelines to calculate fines for
anti-competitive behaviour dating before 1998.112 In those cases however, the
Commission’s guidelines remained within the limits set by (then) Regulation
17 which did of course already foresee the imposition of fines.113 That
reasoning could therefore not be transposed to the present case. Taking a very
formal approach, albeit wholly justified in light of the effet utile of the
Regulation, the Court and the Advocate General found that the conduct which
is sanctioned is not the collection of the data as such but only the actual
communication of the data to the Commission. Since the communication
occurred in 2012, the principle of non-retroactivity of sanctions was
respected.
As time progresses the relevance of the issue of the possible retroactive
application of Regulation 1173/2011 will disappear, but today it evidently still
is problematic. This is illustrated by the second, still ongoing, case in which
the Commission recommended to the Council to impose a fine.114 In its report
on misrepresentation by Austria, the Commission noted that in its scrutiny it
had “included facts which occurred before the entry into force of Regulation
(EU) No 1173/2011 on 13 December 2011. In that regard, it should be kept in
mind that misrepresentation of EDP data was equally unlawful [under]
Regulation 479/2009.”115 At the same time the Commission remarkably
stressed that “for the purpose of applying the special regime of sanction laid
down in Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011, the primary aim of the
investigation has been to examine whether that misrepresentation of data took
place after the entry into force of the latter Regulation.”116
6. Concluding remarks
The present Grand Chamber decision is important on a number of accounts.
The Court has made an important clarification of the scope of Article 291
TFEU, effectively further contributing to the deconstruction of the Treaty of
Lisbon’s reform in this area.
The Court further imposed a reading of Regulation 1173/2011 and
Delegated Decision 2012/678 that allows for an effective and deterrent
mechanism to ensure the communication of proper statistics by the Member
States in the SGP, although it remains to be seen how the Commission will
112. See Case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding Ltd e.a. v. Commission, EU:C:2013:522,
para 75.
113. Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205–208 & 213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri, para 227.
114. See supra note 99.
115. COM(2017)94 final, para 17.
116. Ibid., para 18 (emphasis added).
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exercise its powers under Regulations 479/2009 and 1173/2011. The fact that
the ultimate imposition of a fine depends on the Member States in Council,
voting under the ordinary QMV rules, will probably restrain the Commission
from seeking out the limits of its powers in this respect.
On the issue of impartiality, the Advocate General’s approach appeared
more useful as a precedent to ensure an effective EU administration,
compared to the Court’s solution. An important element in the reasoning of
the Advocate General was the need to take into account the fact that the
Commission’s human resources are limited. If the Court had followed the
Advocate General’s suggestion this would have inter alia helped buttress the
ongoing development whereby enforcement powers are increasingly entrusted
to EU bodies smaller than the Commission.117
Finally, a word seems in place on an issue that only figured incidentally in
the Advocate General’s Opinion but which goes to the heart of the democratic
life of our Union. The repercussions of the opaque trilogues indeed also
reverberated in this case whereby Advocate General Kokott scathingly
observed that “[t]he conditions governing the imposition of a sanction were
not contained in the original Commission proposal but appeared for the first
time — already in the wording that would become final but lacking any
further explanation — in the draft Council Regulation of 16 June 2011. They
were reproduced in that form, again without commentary, in the Parliament’s
observations on that proposal, even though the Rapporteur’s draft had been
silent on the matter.” 118 This was not the first time,119 and it will not be the
last, that the Court is confronted with the trilogues. Figures for the
Parliamentary term of 2009–2014 show that 90 percent of the co-decision
procedures are finalized already in first reading,120 a feat that is only possible
because the institutions make informal deals through the trilogues. While they
may therefore be very effective, they are completely opaque to the EU citizen
and nullify the accountability of actors involved. This also motivated the EU
Ombudsman to start an own-initiative requirement on the transparency of
trilogues in 2015.121 Recently, the General Court has also ruled that the
institutions must give access to the so called four column tables which present
the positions of the institutions and the compromise reached in the trilogues,
117. See Scholten and Luchtman, op. cit. supra note 109.
118. Opinion, para 132.
119. See especially the critical Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in Case C-409/13, Council v.
Commission, EU:C:2014:2470.
120. Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, “The culture of trilogues”, 22 Journal of
European Public Policy (2015), 1148–1165, at 1148.
121. Decision of the European Ombudsman of 12 July 2016 setting out proposals following
her strategic inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the transparency of trilogues.
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when requested to do so by citizens.122 The pressure to repatriate legislative
decision-making from back-room dealings is thus mounting.123 In their
Inter-institutional agreement on Better Law-Making, the institutions agreed to
set up a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files.124 As
of yet, that database has not been set up yet,125 but depending on its content it
may finally re-introduce the necessary transparency and accountability to the
EU’s legislative process.
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